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This contribution considers the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa’s judgments regarding aspects of sentencing. It starts with 
an overview of relevant judgments, before attending in more 
detail to judgments on the minimum sentences legislation and 
on sentencing when it affects children. On this foundation, the 
article then discusses the human rights that are affected by the 
imposition of sentences on offenders, before attempting to 
identify what the next instalment of Constitutional Court 
judgments might bring to the sentencing table.  
This article offers a collection and collation of judgments that 
share one common element, namely that they have something 
to say about an aspect of sentencing. The value of such an 
approach is that it provides the first step to answering the 
following question: The Constitutional Court has been active for 
20 years; what do we learn about sentencing from its judgments 
during this time?  
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1  Introduction 
In 2015 it was 20 years since the official opening of the Constitutional Court 
in South Africa.1 This was a significant milestone in the Court's history. 
Although not a dominant theme, some of the court's judgments directly 
influenced sentencing theory and practices. Some of the judgments had a 
profound influence on the development of constitutional jurisprudence and 
the new constitutional order. 
This contribution considers the Constitutional Court's judgments regarding 
aspects of sentencing. It starts with an overview of relevant judgments, 
before attending in more detail to judgments on the minimum sentences 
legislation and on sentencing when it affects children. On this foundation, 
the article then discusses the human rights that are affected by the 
imposition of sentences on offenders, before attempting to identify what the 
next instalment of Constitutional Court judgments might bring to the 
sentencing table.  
It is worth noting what this article is not intended to do. It does not attempt 
a major discussion of any specific aspect of sentencing, such as minimum 
sentences or the sentencing of child offenders. It is a collection and collation 
of judgments that share one common element, namely that they have 
something to say about an aspect of sentencing. The value of such an 
approach is that it provides the first step to answering the following question: 
The Constitutional Court has been active for 20 years; what do we learn 
about sentencing from its judgments during this time?2  
2  Overview of judgments 
The Constitutional Court's earliest pronouncements on sentencing 
considered the constitutionality of a specific kind of sentence. In short 
succession the Court declared unconstitutional the death penalty, in S v 
Makwanyane,3 and corporal punishment for juvenile offenders, in S v 
Williams.4 No other sentence has been declared unconstitutional since this 
                                            
*  Stephan S Terblanche. B Juris (PU for CHE) LLD (Unisa). Professor, Department of 
Criminal and Procedural Law, UNISA, South Africa. Email: terblss@unisa.ac.za. 
1  The opening, by former President Nelson Mandela, took place on 14 February 1995: 
see Constitutional Court date unknown http://www.constitutionalcourt. 
org.za/site/thecourt/history.htm; Davis, Marcus and Klaaren 1995 Annual Survey 
728. 
2  Such contributions are regular features when important courts, such as the 
Constitutional Court, reach important milestones. See Wilson, Dugard and Clark 
2015 SAJHR 472-503; Bronstein 2014 SAJHR 24-40; Petersen 2014 SAJHR 405-
429. There are even purer "overviews" of Constitutional Court judgments published 
regularly, of which Rautenbach 2008 TSAR 330-348 and Rautenbach 2017 TSAR 
352-369 are but two examples. 
3  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC). 
4  S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC). 
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initial activity. It nearly happened when, in S v Niemand,5 the Court ordered 
"a remedial reading-in"6 of certain words into the Correctional Services Act 
8 of 1959. As a result, declaration as a habitual offender now allows for 
detention of no more than 15 years.7  
In a following series of judgments,8 the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the sentences prescribed in the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 105 of 1997, the so-called "minimum sentences 
legislation". The Court declined to declare unconstitutional any of its 
provisions.  
The Constitutional Court has also been quite active with regard to the rights 
of children. In Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice9 the Court held that 
the minimum sentences did not apply to any children. Earlier, in S v M,10 the 
Court had held that the best interests of the children of a primary caregiver 
had to be taken seriously when sentencing such caregivers. Both these 
judgments raised a number of issues pertinent to the treatment of children 
in general and of child offenders in particular.  
3  The earliest judgments 
3.1 Introduction 
As one of the Court's first judgments,11 S v Makwanyane12 touched on a 
wide spectrum of constitutional and human rights issues. Given this scope, 
and the fact that it dealt with a controversial topic, it is unsurprising that the 
judgment has been subjected to intense scrutiny, both in its immediate 
aftermath and subsequently, and both locally and internationally.13 S v 
Williams14 was a companion judgment: both judgments were decided by the 
                                            
5  S v Niemand 2001 2 SACR 654 (CC). 
6  See Du Toit et al Commentary 28–24. 
7  Release is possible after seven years – see s 73(6)(c) of the Correctional Services 
Act 111 of 1998; S v Trichart 2014 2 SACR 245 (GSJ) para 20. Before the Niemand 
judgment it was considered possible for a habitual offender to be held in prison 
indefinitely – see R v Edwards 1953 3 SA 168 (A); S v Masisi 1996 1 SACR 147 (O) 
152d-e.  
8  See S v Dzukuda 2000 2 SACR 443 (CC); S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC). 
9  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC). 
10  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC). 
11  It was the first case heard by the Court (see Davis, Marcus and Klaaren 1995 Annual 
Survey 728), but the judgment was preceded by S v Zuma 1995 1 SACR 568 (CC), 
dated 5 April 1995. 
12  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC). 
13  See, eg, Carozza 2003 Tex L Rev 1031-1089; Daniels and Brickhill 2006-2007 Penn 
St Int'l L Rev 379-381; Roux Politics of Principle 238-248; Van der Walt 2005 SAPL 
253-265; Milton et al 1995 SACJ 188-204; Mureinik 1995 Annual Survey 29-33; 
Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (2) 420-430. 
14  S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC). 
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same judges, giving judgment only three days apart.15 The Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter the interim Constitution) 
made no mention of either the death penalty or corporal punishment and 
the Court had to consider the complete context of the Bill of Rights in the 
process of determining the constitutionality of these sentences. In the 
process it touched upon many topics such as constitutional interpretation in 
general, the influence of foreign sources, the content and interpretation of 
various rights and, finally, the limitation clause.16  
As others have commented on these judgments in detail, there is little need 
to add to those discussions here. However, I return to them when discussing 
the human rights affected by sentencing. 
4  Developments since Makwanyane 
4.1 Minimum sentences legislation 
4.1.1 Minimum sentences legislation 
It is convenient to set out briefly the history of the minimum sentences 
legislation. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (hereafter the 
Act) came into operation in May 1998.17 Before this happened, sentencing 
was almost exclusively within the discretion of the courts, subject to maxima 
contained in statutory penalty clauses. The Act introduced minimum 
sentences for a large number of the more serious crimes. It was originally 
intended as a temporary measure,18 but has since become permanent.19  
The Act applies to adult offenders convicted of any of the offences listed in 
Schedule 2. This schedule lists a substantial number of offences in four 
categories (or parts) of roughly descending severity. In terms of section 
51(1) of the Act, life imprisonment is prescribed for the offences contained 
in part I of Schedule 2. Essentially this includes aggravated forms of murder 
and rape. The constitutionality of section 51(1) was the subject of the 
judgment in S v Dodo.20 Section 51(2) prescribes minimum sentences for 
the offences listed in the other parts to Schedule 2, starting at 15 years' 
imprisonment21 and decreasing to 5 years' imprisonment.22 Increased 
                                            
15  On 6 and 9 June 1995 respectively. 
16  Section 33 of the Interim Constitution (now s 36 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 – hereafter the Constitution).  
17  Proc R43 in GG 6175 of 1 May 1998. 
18  Section 53(1) of the Act. See Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 2 SACR 477 (CC) para 4. 
19  With the repeal of s 53(1) through the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 
38 of 2007. 
20  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC). 
21  For Part II-offences. 
22  For Part-IV offences. 
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minimum sentences apply when the offender has previous convictions.23 
Importantly, the sentencing courts are permitted to depart from the 
prescribed sentences when a reduced sentence is justified by "substantial 
and compelling circumstances".24 
Originally, regional courts had the power to impose any of the minimum 
periods of imprisonment, even if such a sentence exceeded the regional 
courts' general jurisdiction.25 However, when life imprisonment was 
prescribed, the case had to be committed for sentencing to a high court.26 
The referral process caused severe delays in the finalisation of cases,27 
came under heavy criticism for this reason, and resulted in the first 
consideration of the minimum sentences by the Constitutional Court.  
4.1.2 The Constitutional Court and minimum sentences  
In S v Dzukuda28 the Court considered whether the referral process was 
constitutional or not.29 Its findings are contained in the following summary:30 
Contrary to the findings in the court a quo, the Constitutional Court found that 
a sentencing court does not have to be in a position identical to that of the trial 
court, that there is nothing in section 52 that prevents the High Court from 
obtaining all the information necessary to enable it to impose sentence, and 
that any inadequacies in the trial-court record can be corrected by the 
obtaining of such information in the same way as the sentencing court. 
Importantly, the Court stressed31 that no 
…provision in s 52, requires a High Court to act in a way which would impinge 
on an accused's right to a fair trial. It is for the High Court, in each case 
committed to it under s 52 for sentence, to ensure that the accused receives 
a fair trial and nothing in the section prevents the High Court from doing so. 
With this finding, the Court placed the responsibility of ensuring that the trial 
remains fair, firmly in the hands of the courts. 
                                            
23  The detail of these provisions is discussed in Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (3) 
49-91. 
24  Section 51(3) of the Act. 
25  Section 51(1)(b) of the Act. The legislation never applied to the district magistrates' 
courts: see Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (3) 65-66. 
26  Section 52(2) of the Act. 
27  See S v Dzukuda; S v Tilly; S v Tshilo 2000 2 SACR 51 (W) 56g ff and the cases 
referred to there. Also see O'Donovan and Redpath Impact of Minimum Sentencing 
40-45. 
28  S v Dzukuda 2000 2 SACR 443 (CC). 
29  The trial court in S v Dzukuda; S v Tilly; S v Tshilo 2000 2 SACR 51 (W) held it was 
unconstitutional. 
30  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (2) 73 (original in-text references have been deleted 
for the purposes of the present discussion). 
31  S v Dzukuda 2000 2 SACR 443 (CC) para 49; also see paras 38, 43 and 55. 
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In its second judgment on this legislation, S v Dodo,32 the Court was called 
upon to consider the validity of section 51(1), the provision that prescribes 
life imprisonment. The judgment followed within a few weeks of the 
judgment in S v Malgas,33 where the Supreme Court of Appeal considered 
the minimum sentences legislation in considerable detail, and particularly 
with respect to the "substantial and compelling circumstances" departure 
clause.34 Dodo fully endorsed Malgas's interpretation of the words 
"substantial and compelling circumstances", quoting the summary of the 
judgment in Malgas35 verbatim and holding this to be "a practical method" 
of dealing with the minimum sentences.36 
The essence of the summary in Malgas is the following:37 
 Courts should ordinarily impose the prescribed sentences. 
 The legislature "deliberately left it to the courts" to determine whether 
circumstances justify departure. All traditionally relevant factors have 
to be taken into account in this process. 
 Departure is permissible only when there are "truly convincing 
reasons" for so departing.38 If the prescribed sentence would be 
unjust, in being disproportionate to the crime, the offender and the 
needs of society, "so that an injustice would be done by imposing that 
sentence",39 the court may depart. 
 The result will be a "standardised response"40 with consistently more 
severe sentences. 
The Court concluded in Dodo41 that section 51(1) was not unconstitutional, 
as it "does not compel the court to act inconsistently with the Constitution". 
                                            
32  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC). The judgment was delivered on 5 April 2001. 
33  S v Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA), decided on 19 March 2001. 
34  Section 51(3) of the Act. The words "substantial and compelling circumstances" have 
been subjected to a lot of debate (see Kubista 2005 SACJ 77-86; S v PB 2013 2 
SACR 533 (SCA) para 21).  
35  S v Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA) para 25. 
36  See S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 11; also para 40 (the Malgas 
"construction … is undoubtedly correct…"). 
37  Also see Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice 2009 2 SACR 477 (CC) paras 
17-18. 
38  S v Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA) para 25D. In other words, not lightly or for 
"flimsy" reasons. 
39  S v Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA) para 25I. 
40  S v Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA) para 25G. 
41  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 40. 
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4.1.3 The minimum sentences and separation of powers 
The high court in S v Dodo,42 in finding that section 51(1) was 
unconstitutional, held that the legislature had gone too far in prescribing the 
minimum sentences. It found that this provision "undermine[d] the doctrine 
of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary"43 and that, 
especially life imprisonment, "the most severe penalty open to the High 
Court", is something that "falls within the heartland of the judicial power, and 
is not to be usurped by the Legislature".44 The Constitutional Court 
disagreed with this assessment. 
Stripped to its bare bones, the separation of powers "…requires the 
functions of government to be classified as either legislative, executive or 
judicial and requires each function to be performed by separate branches 
of government".45 The Constitutional Court accepted that the legislature has 
a legitimate interest in the nature and severity of sentences in South 
Africa.46 After all, the legislature has always been involved in creating 
offences and prescribing the sentences for such offences.47 With the 
prescription of minimum sentences, because of the departure clause, the 
legislature had not forced the courts to act in violation of the Constitution, 
as noted above.  
However, there are limits to what the legislature can prescribe with respect 
to sentences. The imposition of an appropriate sentence in a specific 
instance on an individual offender, the Constitutional Court explained, is 
undoubtedly the domain of the judicial power:48 
In the field of sentencing, however, it can be stated as a matter of principle 
that the legislature ought not to oblige the judiciary to impose a punishment 
which is wholly lacking in proportionality to the crime. This would be inimical 
to the rule of law and the constitutional state. It would a fortiori be so if the 
legislature obliged the judiciary to pass a sentence which was inconsistent 
with the … Bill of Rights. 
4.1.4 Amendment of the legislation and subsequent judgments  
In an attempt to alleviate some of the criticism of the Act, the legislature 
amended it in 2007.49 Arguably, the most dramatic amendment was to give 
regional courts the power to impose life imprisonment when it was 
                                            
42  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 301 (E). 
43  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 301 (E) 319j. 
44  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 301 (E) 319h-j. 
45  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 18. 
46  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 23.  
47  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 22. 
48  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 26.  
49  Through the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007. 
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prescribed by section 51(1). Some of the other amendments include the 
following: 
 The legislation became permanent, as the amendment removed the 
renewal requirement. 
 The position of children of 16 and 17 years old was changed. This 
amendment is discussed below. 
These amendments mean that the Act is now substantially different from 
the legislation considered constitutional in Dodo. There is little reason, 
therefore, to accept that Dodo is the Constitutional Court's final word on the 
constitutionality of the Act. 
4.2 Children and sentencing 
4.2.1 Introduction  
The inclusion in the Constitution of specific rights for children opened a new 
chapter in the development of children's rights, both generally and 
specifically when children intersect with the criminal justice system.50 In 
particular the Constitution establishes the best-interests-of-the-child 
principle,51 as well as the principles that imprisonment should be a last 
resort and, when imposed as a last resort, should be for the shortest 
appropriate term.52 
The essence of the new chapter is that children are different from adults.53 
They are different for the following reasons, highlighted in Centre for Child 
Law v Minister of Justice:54  
 Physical vulnerability: Children's bodies are "generally frailer", leaving 
them less "able to protect themselves" and more in need of protection; 
they are "less resourceful in self-maintenance". 
 Psychological vulnerability: Children are more easily influenced and 
pressured by others; "their ability to make choices [is] generally more 
                                            
50  S v Kwalase 2000 2 SACR 135 (C) 139g-i. Also see, for a summary of the new 
chapter, Brandt v S 2005 2 All SA 1 (SCA) para 20; and S v Nkosi 2002 1 SACR 135 
(W) 147f-i. Also see S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 
539 (CC) para 12 ff; the Preamble to the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008; Gallinetti 
"Child Justice in South Africa" 639-640.  
51  Section 28(2) of the Constitution. For an overview of the large number of sources on 
this standard, with some connection to the sentencing of children, see Terblanche 
2012 PELJ 442-445.  
52  Section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution. 
53  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 26.  
54  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) paras 26-28.  
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constricted"; their "as yet unformed character" leaves then more prone 
to impulsive decisions.  
 They have a greater capaity for rehabilitation. 
Specifically relevant to sentencing, the crux of the matter is the following:55 
We recognise that exacting full moral accountability for a misdeed might be 
too harsh because they are not yet adults. Hence we afford children some 
leeway of hope and possibility. 
4.2.2 Children and minimum sentences  
When the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was originally passed, 
the minimum sentences appeared also to apply to children aged 16 and 17 
years at the time of the offence. The main (only) difference was that section 
51(3)(b) required the court to record its reasons for applying the minimum 
sentences to such a child. This provision was "the object of a remarkable 
range of judgments".56 However, in Brandt v S57 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal settled the matter. It held that child offenders had to be treated 
differently to adult offenders for all the reasons noted above.58 This different 
treatment clearly includes the minimum sentences. As a result, when 
sentencing child offenders a court should start "with a clean slate" and not 
with the benchmarks that apply to adult offenders.59  
One of the amendments sought by the Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
Amendment Act 38 of 2007 was to reinstate the minimum sentences for 
child offenders aged 16 and 17.60 This amendment, the Constitutional Court 
held in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice,61 was unconstitutional. 
This judgment can be summarised as follows: 
 The rights contained in section 28 of the Constitution (including the 
paramountcy of the child's best interests and the right not to be 
                                            
55  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 28. 
56  Terblanche 2005 SACJ (2) 389. For an overview of such cases, see Terblanche 
2005 SACJ (1) 112-113.  
57  Brandt v S 2005 2 All SA 1 (SCA) paras 9-12 [also reported as S v B 2006 1 SACR 
311 (SCA)]. For a discussion, see Sloth-Nielsen 2005 Stell LR 98-103. 
58  Brandt v S 2005 2 All SA 1 (SCA) paras 14-15. 
59  Brandt v S 2005 2 All SA 1 (SCA) para 11. 
60  It was the "express object" of the amendment to "reverse" the Brandt decision: see 
Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) paras 6, 22, 53, 58. 
61  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC). 
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detained except as a last resort and then for the shortest appropriate 
period of time) have to be obeyed by Parliament.62  
 The Constitution sharply distinguishes children from adults, and for 
good reasons.63 
 Children who commit heinous crimes may be imprisoned and 
imprisonment remains possible under the best-interests standard.64  
 Detention "must be a last, not a first, or even intermediate, resort".65 
Section 28(1)(g) requires individualised sentences – not the "rigid 
starting point that minimum sentencing entails".66 The legislation 
prescribed life imprisonment as the point of departure – a sentence 
that "is very far from the approach to sentencing that the Bill of Rights 
demands for children".67 
 The limitations to the rights in section 28 were not justified.68 
The Court summarised its finding with the following:69 
Legislation cannot take away the right of 16 and 17 year olds to be detained 
only as a last resort, and for the shortest appropriate period of time, without 
reasons being provided that specifically relate to this group and explain the 
need to change the constitutional disposition applying to them. 
The court's remedy was to amend section 51(6) so that the minimum 
sentences legislation does not apply to anybody under the age of 18.  
                                            
62  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 25. 
63  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) paras 26-28. 
64  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 29. 
65  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 31. 
66  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 32. 
67  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 41. 
68  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 60. 
69  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 63. 
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4.2.3 Sentencing of primary caregivers  
In S v M70 Sachs J posed the following question: When the offender who 
stands to be sentenced is the primary caregiver of a child,71  
… does the new constitutional order require a fresh approach to sentencing? 
More particularly, does s 28 of the Constitution add an extra element to the 
responsibilities of a sentencing court over and above those imposed by the 
Zinn triad, and if so, how should these responsibilities be fulfilled? 
The reference to the Zinn triad72 indicated that the Court would consider the 
general principles of sentencing. In effect, the Court found them to be 
acceptable from a constitutional perspective. 
When it appears or is alleged that the offender in a specific case is taking 
care of a child, the obvious first issue is to determine whether the offender 
is a "primary caregiver".73 The Court explained that74  
a primary caregiver is the person with whom the child lives and who performs 
everyday tasks like ensuring that the child is fed and looked after and that the 
child attends school regularly. 
The Court then concluded, considering its own jurisprudence on the best-
interests-of-the-child standard,75 that it is a right that can be limited, 
particularly with regard to its relationship with other rights.76 How then, 
should a sentencing court give the best interests of the child their rightful 
place when sentencing a child's caregiver? In answering this question,77 the 
court advised that it should be "a standard preoccupation" of sentencing 
courts to find a balance among all the different interests involved. If 
necessary, sentencers need to change their current mind-set, because the 
children need focussed attention whenever their interests arise during the 
sentencing process. However, the general approach that courts are 
expected to take when determining an appropriate sentence remains the 
approach established in Zinn, namely that the sentence is determined with 
reference to "the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests 
of society".78 When the offender is a primary caregiver of any children these 
                                            
70  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC). See Skelton 
2008 CCR 351-368; Mujuzi 2011 SACJ (1) 164-177; Gallinetti 2010 SAPL 108-123; 
Erasmus 2010 SAPL 124-136.  
71  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 11.  
72  See S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 (A) 540G-H. 
73  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 36(a).  
74  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 28. 
75  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) paras 15 
and 16. According to Skelton 2008 CCR 351, 358-359, 360-363 the court gave more 
attention to the best interests' principle in this case than it did in any other previous 
case. 
76  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 26. 
77  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 33. For 
a useful summary of this judgment, see S v GL 2010 2 SACR 488 (WCC) para 18. 
78  S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 (A) 540G-H; see Rautenbach 2008 TSAR 341. 
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general principles should be applied in accordance with the following 
"guidelines":  
a) If the general approach ("the Zinn-triad approach") indicates that "the 
appropriate sentence is clearly custodial", the court must ensure that 
the children are cared for, through some alternative means.79 
b) If a non-custodial sentence is "clearly" appropriate, the court must take 
into account the interests of the children when determining the detail 
of such a sentence.80 
c) If the appropriate sentence is not clearly either custodial or non-
custodial, then the best interests of the children standard becomes an 
important guiding principle in determining the sentence to impose.81 
In terms of these guidelines, therefore, the interests of the children become 
an independent sentencing factor only when the application of the triad of 
Zinn does not clearly indicate whether the appropriate sentence is either 
custodial or non-custodial.82 Sachs J also believed that these guidelines 
would "promote uniformity of principle, consistency of treatment and 
individualisation of outcome".83  
The Court followed this theoretical assessment with a practical 
determination of the appropriate sentence in this case. It considered the 
aggravating features: that M was a repeat offender who deliberately 
defrauded different retailers with a third party's credit card, over a period of 
time, with greed as the motive.84 The Court then confirmed the sentence of 
four years' imprisonment, but suspended 45 months thereof, in the process 
ensuring M's immediate release. In addition, it imposed three years' 
correctional supervision, including conditions such as that M had to perform 
community service, repay the victims, and undergo regular counselling. 
The judgment prompted many positive responses. One such response was 
that85  
S v M has revolutionised sentencing in cases where the person convicted is 
the primary caregiver of young children. It has reasserted the central role of 
the interests of young children as an independent consideration in the 
sentencing process. 
                                            
79  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 36(c). 
80  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 36(d). 
81  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 36(e). 
82  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 39. 
83  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 36. 
84  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 52. See 
also Cowling 2007 Annual Survey 356. 
85  See MS v S (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2011 2 SACR 88 (CC) para 
62; also Skelton 2008 CCR 358. 
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In practice the belief of Sachs J that the guidelines would promote 
consistency was probably too optimistic. Sometimes these guidelines have 
simply been ignored.86 In other cases the sentencing court decided that 
imprisonment was unavoidable because of the seriousness of the crime.87 
This is also one of the rare instances where the Court found it necessary, 
within a few years only, to provide further guidance through a similar case. 
In MS v S88 the Court imposed a very different sentence from that imposed 
in S v M, based on the facts of the case. It is really not clear what these 
distinguishing facts were.89 
4.2.4 Conclusion  
With these judgments the Constitutional Court brought some clarity to the 
sentencing of child offenders, with a heavy emphasis on the need to treat 
child offenders differently from adults and for courts to take the best 
interests of children seriously. Much room remain for these considerations 
to make an impact on sentencing practices in our child justice courts. 
5 Important human rights connected to sentencing 
The focus of this contribution now needs to shift to the connection between 
sentencing and specific human rights. Two of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, which were also considered in S v Makwanyane,90 are of particular 
importance to sentencing in general. These are the prohibition against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment, and the right to dignity.  
5.1 Cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment 
Section 11(2) of the Interim Constitution prohibited "cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment".91 The wording of the Constitution is 
slightly different,92 in that section 12 first establishes the right to freedom 
and security of the person, and then includes, within this right, the "right not 
                                            
86  See S v Pillay 2011 2 SACR 409 (SCA); S v Londe 2011 1 SACR 377 (ECG); S v 
Mthethwa 2015 1 SACR 609 (GP). 
87  Eg, S v Langa 2010 2 SACR 289 (KZP) para 11 (the crimes included murder and 
kidnapping). 
88  MS v S (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2011 2 SACR 88 (CC) para 7. 
89  See the minority judgment (Khampepe J) para 47: "… the only conspicuous 
difference between M and Mrs S [MS] is that Mrs S is married to an almost absent 
father, whereas M was not married to any of the absent fathers of her children". See 
also Mujuzi 2011 SACJ (2) 402; Terblanche 2011 Annual Survey 1194. 
90  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC). 
91  In S v Niemand 2001 2 SACR 654 (CC) fn 21 the Court noted equivalent terminology 
in international documents, such as art 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and art 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
92  Some of the reasons for the change are detailed by Bishop and Woolman "Freedom 
and Security" 40-1-40-5, but none of them relate to sentencing. 
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to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way".93 The 
question is whether these changes make any material difference. As is 
indicated in what follows, the answer is almost certainly in the negative.  
5.1.1 Freedom 
Despite freedom’s being the broader right protected by section 12(1) of the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court has not really deliberated on this right 
in its assessment of what amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment. Freedom clearly is important in the realm of sentencing, 
because any form of detention inevitably infringes upon the right to be free.94 
Infringement upon the right to freedom is easily justified when such 
infringement follows the commission of a crime. However, such justification 
should be subject to the principles that apply to any limitation of rights, as 
discussed below. This scrutiny has been absent from our courts' 
discussions of section 12.  
5.1.2 Cruel, inhuman, degrading  
5.1.2.1 General 
The Constitutional Court itself noted that the wording of the provisions in the 
interim Constitution and the Constitution prohibiting cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment is essentially the same.95 One 
consequence of this concession is that judgments on the Interim 
Constitution remain valid despite the slightly different wording of the final 
Constitution. Thus, in S v Williams,96 the Court held that the prohibition 
should be read "disjunctively",97 involving the following seven "modes of 
conduct": "torture; cruel treatment; inhuman treatment; degrading 
treatment; cruel punishment; inhuman punishment and degrading 
punishment".98 Our courts have not yet considered it necessary to 
distinguish between cruel, inhuman, and degrading.99 The Constitutional 
Court thought that a clear separation would be hard.100  
                                            
93  Section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution.  
94  It is clear that the restriction of freedom means the "restriction of physical 
movement", and that imprisonment "always constitutes a 'deprivation' [of freedom] 
for the purpose of FC s 12(1)(a)": Bishop and Woolman "Freedom and Security" 40-
32. Also see De Lange v Smuts 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) para 28: any "restriction of 
physical movement'" is covered. 
95  S v Niemand 2001 2 SACR 654 (CC) para 20. 
96  S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC). 
97  Meaning "in the alternative" – see Oxford South African Concise Dictionary. 
98  S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC) para 20. Also see Mahomed J in S v 
Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 276; S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 
35; Ex parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In Re Corporal Punishment 1991 3 SA 76 
(NmSC) 86. 
99  See Bishop and Woolman "Freedom and Security" 40-66. 
100  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 35. The Makwanyane court also did not 
distinguish the concepts – Chaskalson P (S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) 
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The Court gave its most detailed discussion of the prohibition against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment in S v Dodo.101 In particular, it linked the 
prohibited punishment to two constitutional principles, namely those of 
proportionality and of dignity. Since dignity is itself a constitutional right, it is 
discussed below,102 while proportionality is considered next.  
5.1.2.2 Proportionality 
The importance of proportionality within the current enquiry is explained as 
follows in S v Dodo:103  
The concept of proportionality goes to the heart of the inquiry as to whether 
punishment is cruel, inhuman or degrading, particularly where, as here, it is 
almost exclusively the length of time for which an offender is sentenced that 
is in issue.  
Why would proportionality go "to the heart of the inquiry"? The logic runs as 
follows.104 In terms of section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution a person may "not 
to be deprived of freedom ... without just cause". When a crime is 
committed, it provides the "just cause" to deprive the offender of his 
freedom. However, not every crime justifies the deprivation of liberty. This 
happens only when such deprivation is "reasonably necessary to curb the 
offence and punish the offender", having regard to all the personal and other 
factors "which could have a bearing on the seriousness of the offence and 
the culpability of the offender". This means that "the length of punishment 
must be proportionate to the offence".  
This explanation in Dodo can be seen as a statement of the constitutional 
proportionality requirement for sentencing. Since it directly refers to the 
seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the offender, the question 
arises whether it is fundamentally different from the trite sentencing 
principles established in S v Zinn.105 Notable differences include that Dodo 
does not refer explicitly to the interests of society, and that the personal "and 
other" circumstances appear to be limited to those with a "bearing on the 
seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the offender".106 Focussing 
on the "seriousness of the crime" (Dodo) is certainly more specific than just 
"the crime" (Zinn), as is "the culpability of the offender" when compared with 
                                            
para 95) concluded that the death penalty was cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment; also see Mahomed J paras 277-281. Also see Milton et al 1995 SACJ 
195-197. 
101  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC). For a summary, see Currie and De Waal Bill of 
Rights Handbook 284-285. 
102  See para 5.2. 
103  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 37. The Court also noted the connection in 
S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 94, that proportionality is "an ingredient" 
of the cruel, inhuman or degrading enquiry.  
104  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 37. 
105  S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 (A) 540G-H.  
106  This language resembles that used in SALC Sentencing clause 2, regarding the 
main proposals for the reform of sentencing in South Africa.  
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just "the offender". So far, there has been little recognition that Dodo might 
contain a restatement of the trite sentencing principles.  
5.1.2.3 Gross disproportionality and the position in the USA and Canada 
Although S v Dodo107 noted that "the length of punishment must be 
proportionate to the offence", it also noted that "mere disproportionality" 
would not violate the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment. This could happen only when there is "gross 
disproportionality".108  
When, or against which standards, would disproportionality become 
"gross"? 109 Dodo found useful guidance to the answer from judgments by 
the United States of America (USA) and Canadian supreme courts. Some 
of these judgments were attended to in some detail in Ackermann J's 
discussion of the separation of powers.110 The Court referred, inter alia, to 
R v Latimer,111 that "the test for determining whether a sentence is 
disproportionately long is 'very properly stringent and demanding ... [for] ... 
[a] lesser test would tend to trivialize the Charter' (emphasis in the 
original)".112 This stringent and demanding test amounts to the following:113  
The criterion which is applied to determine whether a mandatory minimum 
punishment is cruel and unusual is ‘whether the punishment prescribed is so 
excessive as to outrage standards of decency;’ the ‘effect of that punishment 
must not be grossly disproportionate to what would have been appropriate’. 
Dodo also includes several examples of cases in which the North American 
courts have held the prescribed sentences not to be grossly 
disproportionate. Here, however, Ackermann J noted that none of these 
references should be understood as "agreement … with the application of 
the gross disproportionality test to the legislation or facts in such 
decision".114 This is an important qualification, as the approaches followed 
in one country might give a totally foreign outcome to "standards of decency" 
in another.115  
The gross proportionality standards in the USA and Canada are neither 
simple, nor equal in practical application, nor fixed in time. Much has been 
                                            
107  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 37.  
108  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 39. Also Bishop and Woolman "Freedom and 
Security" 40-71. 
109  "Gross" in this sense is probably best equated with "blatant" – see Oxford South 
African Dictionary vide "Gross". 
110  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) paras 28-31.  
111  R v Latimer 2001 SCC 1 para 76.  
112  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 31.  
113  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 30.  
114  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 39.  
115  As noted in S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 31.  
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written about these standards. What follows is a brief overview of the current 
position.  
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution outlaws "cruel and 
unusual punishment".116 The grossly disproportionate standard has been 
deduced from this Amendment. However, apart from some death penalty 
judgments,117 the sentence prescribed in legislation has been declared 
invalid for violating the Eighth Amendment in only one example. This 
happened in Solem v Helm,118 where life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony119 was declared 
unconstitutional. 
Otherwise, the US Supreme Court has consistently held that prescribed 
sentences are not sufficiently disproportionate.120 The following cases are 
all examples where the Court was not prepared to interfere with the 
prescribed sentences: 
 In Rummel v Estelle121 the defendant was sentenced to life 
imprisonment (with the possibility of parole after 12 years), for his third 
felony conviction. All his convictions were for economic offences, 
involving amounts between $28 and $121.  
 Harmelin v Michigan122 involved possession of 672 grams of cocaine, 
only a little more than the 650 grams limit above which life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole was prescribed.  
 California's "Three Strikes and You're Out Laws" were considered in 
Ewing v California:123 In accordance with this legislation, the trial court 
imposed life imprisonment (without parole for the first 25 years) for the 
theft of golf clubs worth $1 200.  
Most of these sentences are more severe than the severest sentence that 
can be imposed in South Africa for the gravest crimes. 
                                            
116  US Const amend VIII.  
117  See Gregg v Georgia 428 US 153 (1976). Also see Roper v Simmons 543 US 551 
(2005) (death penalty for children declared unconstitutional); Atkins v Virginia 536 
US 304 (2002) (death penalty for mentally ill offenders declared unconstitutional). 
118  Solem v Helm 463 US 277 (1983). 
119  "Felony" is an Anglo-American term for more serious crimes where, very generally 
speaking, imprisonment without the option of a fine is a permissible sentence. 
120  Brennan 2004 J Crim L & Criminology 554-558. 
121  Rummel v Estelle 445 US 263 (1980) 274-75. 
122  Harmelin v Michigan 501 US 957 (1991). 
123  Ewing v California 538 US 11 (2003) – see 32. Also see Kurki "International 
Standards for Sentencing" 364: "In California, any felony counts as the third strike 
because only the first two convictions need to be from a list of more serious offenses 
… Thus a minor theft or marijuana possession may result in a life sentence" (with 
parole after 25 years). 
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These sentences are also very different from the position in Canada. It used 
to be rare for the Canadian Supreme Court to declare "mandatory minimum 
sentences" unconstitutional. However, the Court has done so in the two 
recent cases of R v Nur124 and R v Lloyd.125  
In Lloyd the Court declared unconstitutional a provision prescribing a 
minimum sentence of one year's imprisonment for "trafficking or possession 
for the purpose of trafficking" of certain drugs, if the offender had had 
another drug conviction within the previous ten years. It is worth repeating 
that the prescribed sentence found to be unconstitutional was a sentence 
of one year's imprisonment. The Court's finding was based on the principle 
established in Nur126 that a law violates the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment if (1) "it imposes a grossly disproportionate sentence 
on the individual before the court", or (2) it "will impose grossly 
disproportionate sentences on others" when "reasonably foreseeable 
applications" are considered.127 In other words, the Court considered not 
only the facts of the case before it but also the proportionality of the 
minimum sentence in other scenarios that could reasonably be foreseen. 
The Court added that,128 
… mandatory minimum sentences that, as here, apply to offences that can be 
committed in various ways, under a broad array of circumstances and by a 
wide range of people are vulnerable to constitutional challenge. 
The final words apply to South African minimum sentences too.  
To conclude this discussion: Although the same words are used to 
determine the constitutionality of prescribed sentences in the USA and 
Canada, the practice is so different that these words are almost 
meaningless. In particular, when comparisons are made with the sentences 
imposed in the USA, it is important to realise that punishment in the USA 
tends to be much harsher than in most other countries with a constitutional 
dispensation.129  
5.1.3 In conclusion: cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment 
Many questions remain about proportionality and sentencing, and it remains 
unknown how the Constitutional Court will apply the grossly 
disproportionate standard. Given the increasingly long sentences that tend 
                                            
124  R v Nur 2015 1 SCR 773. 
125  R v Lloyd 2016 1 SCC 130. 
126  R v Nur 2015 1 SCR 773 para 77. 
127  R v Lloyd 2016 1 SCC 130 para 22. 
128  R v Lloyd 2016 1 SCC 130 para 35. 
129  See Tonry "Punishment Policies" 15 (US punishment policies are harsher than those 
of other countries), 21 (a large number of mandatory penalties are found only in the 
USA); Tonry and Hatlestad Sentencing Reform 249: "The severity of criminal 
penalties in the United States in the 1990s is unprecedented in American history and 
unequalled in any Western country in this century." 
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to be imposed by our courts and required by the legislature, these questions 
might well have to be answered in the not too distant future.  
5.2 Dignity 
Dignity is ensconced in the Constitution where it declares that "Everyone 
has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected."130 It is barely possible to overstate its importance.131 From the 
many examples that could be quoted, the Constitutional Court noted in 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama132 that the right to dignity is "the most important of 
all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights". In relation to 
criminal law, dignity has been described as a "foundational value", being at 
the foundation of rights such as freedom and physical integrity.133 Dignity is 
also closely related to the prohibition against cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment. Ackermann J wrote in S v Dodo134 that "the impairment of 
human dignity … must be involved in all three" of these adjectives.135 
Specifically on the proportionality between the crime and the sentence, 
Ackermann J continued that not to consider such proportionality would be 
"… to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the very heart of human 
dignity".136  
It is submitted that the imposition of any sentence tends to impact the dignity 
of the person punished.137 If this submission is debatable, it is at least clear 
that, logically, the prohibition against "degrading" punishment is inseparable 
from the right to have even offenders' dignity protected and respected. 
                                            
130  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
131  This is true even of S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) where dignity played a 
secondary role in the court's decision (see Kende 2006 Geo Wash Int'l L Rev 223; 
Freedman 1995 SACJ 197-202). Most of the judges in Makwanyane stressed the 
value of human dignity and the right thereto: see Chaskalson P para 10; Mahomed 
J para 271; Mokgoro J para 309; Sachs J para 346; Langa J para 216; O'Regan J 
para 328, stating that dignity cannot be overemphasised. Also see Ex parte Minister 
of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters 2002 2 SACR 105 (CC) para 5, following 
the words "…a thread that ran through all [the considerations noted in Makwanyane] 
was the great store our Constitution puts on the two interrelated rights to life and to 
dignity". 
132  Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 8 BCLR 918 (CC) para 68, quoting S v Makwanyane 
1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 144.  
133  See Hoctor 2004 SALJ 306.  
134  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 35.  
135  Ferreira and Steyn 2006 SAPL 109 argues that, logically, a sentence considered 
cruel, inhuman or degrading will also violate the right to dignity. 
136  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 38. Also see below, in connection with longer 
prison sentences. 
 137  Also see Ferreira and Steyn 2006 SAPL 97 (the fundamental rights of an offender 
are clearly limited by the imposition of a sentence).  
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Dignity gains prominence with any long sentence.138 Long prison sentences 
are often justified by their supposed deterrent effect.139 In S v Dodo140 the 
Court warned that, when "the length of a sentence … bears no relation to 
the gravity of the offence", because of an attempt to add a deterrent effect, 
"… the offender is being used essentially as a means to another end and 
the offender's dignity assailed". In contrast, dignity reminds us that human 
beings have "inherent and infinite worth" and cannot be used "as means to 
an end".141 
Exemplary sentences are, therefore, constitutionally problematic.142 While it 
is clear that sentences cannot just be increased for their supposed deterrent 
effect, as if there were no constitutional consequences, it remains an open 
question in our law where the line should be drawn or where the tipping 
point would be reached.  
5.3 Limitation clause 
5.3.1 Overview and application to sentencing 
It is already trite that the infringement upon a right is only part of the 
constitutional issue, as it also needs to be established whether such a 
limitation might not be constitutionally acceptable. Legislation prescribing a 
sentence might infringe upon rights such as dignity and the prohibition 
against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, but such an infringement 
will not be unconstitutional if proven to be justified. This two-stage approach 
is required by the limitation clause in the Constitution143 (and was required 
in the preceding interim Constitution).144  
One of the most frequently cited dicta about the way in which courts should 
approach limitations comes from S v Makwanyane.145 Its essence can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Constitutional rights may be limited for purposes that would be 
reasonable and necessary in "an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality". 
 There are no fixed standards, and the courts are required to determine 
the issue of limitation on a case by case basis. 
                                            
 138  See Ferreira and Steyn 2006 SAPL 100-101.  
139  See para 5.3.4 below. 
140  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 38. For a similar warning, if in a somewhat 
different context, see S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC) para 85. 
141  The principle that no human being should ever be treated as a mere object is also 
known as the "Kantian" view of dignity – see Ackermann Human Dignity 100-101.  
142  See Mellon 2009 SACJ 341-342. 
143  Section 36 of the Constitution. 
144  Section 33 of the Interim Constitution. 
145  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 104. Also see Ferreira and Steyn 2006 
SAPL 102-104. 
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 In the course of this determination the requirement of proportionality, 
"which calls for the balancing of different interests", is central.146 
Given the topic of sentencing, it is useful to quote one more summary of 
what is at stake, from Centre of Child Law v Minister of Justice:147  
In determining whether a limitation is reasonable and justifiable within the 
meaning of s 36 of the Constitution, 'it is necessary to weigh the extent of the 
limitation of the right, on the one hand, with the purpose, importance and effect 
of the infringing provision on the other, taking into account the availability of 
less restrictive means to achieve this purpose'. 
5.3.2 The balancing requirement of proportionality 
As noted above, the limitation assessment involves a proportionality 
requirement, which requires a balancing of various relevant considerations. 
According to Makwanyane148 this process includes  
… the nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the 
right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent 
of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be 
necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through 
other means less damaging to the right in question. 
The sentencing of offenders lends itself well to the notion of more or less 
damaging measures. In Barrie's assessment, the court in Makwanyane 
"saw the effects of the death penalty as too drastic and saw life 
imprisonment as a less restrictive means which would achieve the same 
purpose".149 More generally, the "less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose" requirement means that "a less restrictive but equally effective 
form of punishment" must be imposed, if available in a specific case,150 
because "a law which invades rights more than is necessary to achieve its 
purpose is disproportionate".151 
It is clear that the "proportionality" noted in the limitations assessment is 
substantially different from the "proportionality" required between the crime 
and the sentence.152 The risk when using the same term for different 
concepts is that clarity is easily lost. Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, 
the Constitutional Court has not addressed this issue, nor has it really been 
called upon to do so. Roughly half of the cases discussed in this contribution 
                                            
146  For more detail on the balancing of interests, see para 5.3.2 below. 
147  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 51. The quote is from Richter v Minister for Home Affairs 2009 
3 SA 615 (CC) para 71. 
148  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 104. Also see Ferreira and Steyn 2006 
SAPL 106-107. 
149  Barrie 2013 SAPL 54. 
150  Ferreira and Steyn 2006 SAPL 107. 
151  Barrie 2013 SAPL 54. 
152  See para 5.1.2.2 above. 
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did not involve the second phase, as no infringement was found to have 
occurred.153 Apart from S v Dodo,154 proportionality as a sentencing 
requirement has not been considered in detail in any other case, with the 
result that the Court has so far been able to avoid the need to carefully 
address both forms of proportionality in one case.155  
5.3.3 Practical examples of the limitation clause regarding sentencing  
In Makwanyane and Williams it was clear that rights were violated, including 
important rights such as life and dignity.156 The respondent in Makwanyane 
offered as justification the fact that public opinion supported the death 
penalty, as well as all the purposes of punishment. These purposes of 
punishment include retribution, deterrence and incapacitation. However, the 
respondent could not provide sufficient data to satisfy the court that these 
reasons could justify the retention of the death penalty, especially given the 
availability of life imprisonment as "a severe alternative punishment", 
compared to the "destruction of life and dignity" involved in the death 
penalty.157  
Similar arguments were offered in S v Williams.158 The state argued that 
corporal punishment was justified, on the one hand, as a practical solution 
to the limited alternative options and shortage of resources and, on the other 
hand, as a deterrent.159 The court rejected these arguments. First, it showed 
that significant alternative measures existed,160 and found that the state 
failed to show that the deterrent effect of corporal punishment was 
significantly stronger than the deterrent effect of these other measures.161 
In Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice162 the government argued that 
the minimum sentences legislation needed to apply to 16 and 17 year olds 
because of the harm caused by their crimes, which would be offset by these 
sentences.163 Again the government was unsuccessful, as it could offer no 
                                            
153  See S v Dzukuda 2000 2 SACR 443 (CC); S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC); S v 
Niemand 2001 2 SACR 654 (CC). 
154  See para 5.1.2.2 above. 
155  In S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) Chaskalson P dealt with proportionality 
only as a test for limiting violation of the rights (paras 104-109, 132); see also 
O'Regan J para 339; Sachs J paras 348-357.  
156  Life and dignity are "values of the highest order" and an infringement can only be 
justified given "a clear and convincing case" (S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) 
para 111 Chaskalson P) or, the infringement must be "manifestly reasonable" (para 
210 Kriegler J). 
157  S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 145. 
158  S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC). 
159  S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC) paras 61-64. 
160  S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC) paras 66-75. 
161  S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC) paras 80-84. 
162  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC). 
163  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 53. 
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facts to support these arguments.164 It was finally rejected since "high crime 
levels and well-justified public anger do not provide justification for a 
legislative intervention overriding a specific protection in the Bill of 
Rights".165 
These findings induce us to ask whether there could ever be a justification 
for a law that amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. The view 
of Ferreira and Steyn166 that "cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment of 
necessity constitutes an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the 
fundamental rights of the offender in terms of section 36" might well prove 
to be correct.  
In terms of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms a violation of its 
rights can also be justified.167 Given the guidance that the Constitutional 
Court has already obtained from Canadian cases in determining the 
constitutionality of South African legislation,168 it is useful to consider how 
the Canadian Supreme Court has dealt with the current issue. In R v 
Lloyd169 it held as follows, before declaring unconstitutional a sentence of 
one year's imprisonment for dealing in certain drugs: although combatting 
drug dealing is an important objective, and although there is a rational 
connection between this objective and the prescribed sentence, the170  
… Crown has not established that less harmful means to achieve Parliament's 
objective of combatting the distribution of illicit drugs, whether by narrowing 
the reach of the law or by providing for judicial discretion in exceptional cases, 
were not available. Nor has it shown that the impact of the limit on offenders 
deprived of their rights is proportionate to the good flowing from their inclusion 
in the law. 
Even though the minimum sentence was one of only one year's 
imprisonment, and the crime quite serious, the Court still required of the 
state to show that the legislative measures would be functional.  
5.3.4 The limitation clause: conclusion  
The Constitutional Court is yet to find a sentencing provision that violates 
human rights to be constitutionally justified.  
                                            
164  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 54. 
165  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 60. 
166  Ferreira and Steyn 2006 SAPL 108. 
167  Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
168  See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 152 (the Canadian Charter is the 
"principal model for the South African Bill of Rights"). 
169  R v Lloyd 2016 1 SCC 130 – see para 5.1.2.3 above for a discussion of this case. 
170  R v Lloyd 2016 1 SCC 130 para 49. 
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6 Future developments related to sentencing 
6.1  Introduction 
The discussion above highlights certain areas that have either not received 
any attention, or insufficient attention, from the Constitutional Court. These 
can be summarised as follows: 
 The right to freedom of the person, as the foundation of the prohibition 
against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, needs to be 
incorporated into discussions of the constitutionality of longer prison 
sentences. 
 An explicit discussion of the relationship between the principles for a 
proportionate sentence, as formulated in S v Dodo,171 and the 
traditional triad of elements that determine an appropriate sentence, 
as phrased in S v Zinn,172 would add a lot of value to the Court's 
sentencing jurisprudence. 
 Further development is still possible in connection with the meaning of 
"cruel, inhuman or degrading". Such further development might well 
show that the words "cruel" and "inhuman" are virtual synonyms, but 
that "degrading" is substantively different. After all, the connection 
between degrading punishment and the concept of dignity is 
immediately apparent, whereas this is not necessarily the case with 
cruel and inhuman punishment. 
 The "gross disproportionality standard" and its connection with North 
American laws need further clarification. Until this has been done, the 
grossly disproportionate standard is not useful for South African 
purposes. 
 Uncertainty remains as to whether a sentence that violates the 
prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment could then 
be justified in terms of the limitations clause. 
It is submitted that the minimum sentences legislation is the closest to being 
unconstitutional of any statutorily regulated aspect of sentencing and, 
therefore, a probable candidate for a next constitutional challenge. Several 
of the above-mentioned areas needing clarification would require attention 
in determining the continued constitutionality of this legislation. 
                                            
171  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 37.  
172  S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 (A) 540G-H. 
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6.2 Minimum sentences legislation 
Since the constitutionality of this legislation has already been considered in 
S v Dodo,173 one first needs to establish why a reconsideration might be on 
the cards.  
6.2.1 The legislation has been amended 
The first point is that the current minimum sentences legislation is not the 
same as that considered by Dodo. As noted in paragraph 4.1.4 above, 
following the amendment in 2007 it now contains several further 
troublesome elements. The following two are possibly the most troublesome 
of these.  
6.2.1.1 No longer temporary 
Van Zyl Smit174 argued that the mere fact that the legislation is not 
temporary any longer would justify a reconsideration on its constitutionality. 
This argument carries considerable weight. Several judgments noted the 
poor legislative language used in the legislation, but also noted the 
temporary, "emergency", nature of the measures.175 Because of this factor, 
it is conceivable that they treated the legislation with more patience than 
they would have done otherwise.176  
6.2.1.2 Life imprisonment and the regional courts 
Regional courts now have the power to impose life imprisonment when 
prescribed for the crimes listed in Part I of Schedule 2.177 This means that 
regional magistrates have far greater powers for these crimes, because they 
are limited to 15 years' imprisonment for all other crimes. Why should this 
be the case? This raises the further question why higher courts (with 
presiding judges) normally have a higher punitive jurisdiction than lower 
courts (with presiding magistrates). Logically speaking, the most obvious 
answer is that greater power is justified by greater experience and 
knowledge. The appointment of judges is preceded by more careful 
scrutiny, during a more involved process, than is the case with 
magistrates.178 Why then do regional magistrates get the same powers as 
judges, just for some of the offences covered by the minimum sentences 
legislation?  
                                            
173  S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC).  
174  See Van Zyl Smit "Sentencing" 49-14 (it is not a "relatively short-term response" any 
longer); also Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (3) 91. 
175  Cf S v Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA) para 7 (due weight should be given to this 
fact). 
176  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (3) 51. 
177  See para 4.1.4.  
178  See, on the selection and appointment of judicial officers, Hoexter and Olivier 
Judiciary in South Africa 123-141 (judges), 325-328 (magistrates).  
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Pragmatism appears to be the only answer. With the minimum sentences 
in place, there are now so many cases requiring life imprisonment that high 
courts cannot cope with the workload.179 If this is so, then some offenders 
are being sentenced to the maximum sentence available to courts in South 
Africa by judicial officers who are potentially less competent than others, a 
situation that could violate the rights to equality and to a fair trial. It should 
be noted here that pragmatism does not have a good success rate as a 
justification for the violation of human rights.180 
6.2.2 Looking beyond the prescribed life imprisonment 
Dodo considered only the validity of section 51(1), prescribing life 
imprisonment. It did not consider the other provisions, and it did not consider 
the logic of the legislation internally – in other words, it did not consider how 
the severity of the prescribed sentences relates to the objective gravity of 
the different offences in comparison with one another.  
The point is that the minimum sentences legislation contains just four 
sentences for a broad array of the most serious crimes that can be 
committed in terms of our criminal law: imprisonment for life, for 15 years, 
10 years and 5 years.181 It also contains several inexplicable 
inconsistencies, with the sentencing "cliffs" for rape a particularly notable 
example:182 when accompanied by one of the aggravating features noted in 
Part I of Schedule 1, the sentence is life imprisonment; without such a 
feature, the point of departure183 is a minimum sentence of 10 years' 
imprisonment.184 Courts follow a rather different approach when sentencing. 
They have to carefully individualise their sentences by considering all the 
factors relevant to the matter, in particular those mitigating or aggravating 
the crime and those that affect the culpability of the offender.185 To this end 
courts are endowed with a wide discretion, because every case is unique186 
and the sentence has to cater for each important unique feature of the 
                                            
179  See De Kock "Minimum Sentences" 33-37. 
180  See R v Lloyd 2016 1 SCR 130, as discussed in para 5.1.2.3 above. 
181  That there are increases when previous convictions are present (s 51(2) of the Act) 
does not change the position that in essence the legislation imposes only these four 
sentences.  
182  See Scurry Baehr 2008 Yale J L & Feminism 226; Van der Merwe 2013 SACJ 411.  
183  S v Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA) para 8; S v Mabuza 2009 2 SACR 435 (SCA) 
para 20 ("benchmark"); S v Tuswa 2013 2 SACR 269 (KZP) para 63 ("starting point").  
184  See S v Vilakazi 2009 1 SACR 552 (SCA) para 13: "What is striking about that 
regime is the absence of any gradation between ten years' imprisonment and life 
imprisonment. The minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment progresses 
immediately to the maximum sentence that our law allows once any of the 
aggravating features is present, irrespective of how many of those features are 
present, irrespective of the degree in which the feature is present, and irrespective 
of whether the convicted person is a first or repeat offender."  
185  See S v Maake 2011 1 SACR 263 (SCA) paras 19-20; S v Mathebula 2012 1 SACR 
374 (SCA) para 10. 
186  See S v S 1995 1 SACR 267 (A) 272g-h; S v Jimenez 2003 1 SACR 507 (SCA) para 
6; S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 94. 
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case.187 The resultant sentences also typically show that crime seriousness 
is properly reflected, not in a graph of four bars, but in a line that starts close 
to zero and smoothly rises to cater for even small increases in gravity. When 
the sentencing discretion is left with the courts, they impose sentences, for 
example in the case of murder, ranging from "detention until the rising of the 
court"188 through correctional supervision189 and totally suspended 
sentences, to imprisonment of every imaginable duration up to life 
imprisonment. 
The courts also have to explain why they impose a specific sentence, and 
how they decided on the duration of the sentence. This requirement "has 
long been recognised", and is demanded by the interests of justice,190 as 
explained by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Maake:191 
It is not only a salutary practice, but obligatory for judicial officers to provide 
reasons to substantiate conclusions. … In an article …, ['Writing a Judgment' 
(1998) SALJ 115 at 116–128] former Chief Justice MM Corbett pointed out 
that this general rule applies to both civil and criminal cases. [20] When a 
matter is taken on appeal, a court of appeal has a similar interest in knowing 
why a judicial officer who heard the matter made the order which he did. 
Broader considerations come into play. It is in the interests of the open and 
proper administration of justice that courts state publicly the reasons for their 
decisions. A statement of reasons gives some assurance that the court gave 
due consideration to the matter and did not act arbitrarily. This is important in 
the maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice. [21] 
Before the matter was dealt with statutorily the same general rule of practice 
applied in criminal matters, both in regard to conviction and sentence. 
The court then referred to several cases in which the importance of a 
judgment is stressed as being "clearly in the interest of justice".192 
Specifically with respect to sentencing, the court quoted with clear 
approval193 the following from S v Immelman:194 
It seems to me that, with regard to the sentence of the Court in cases where 
the trial Judge enjoys a discretion, a statement of the reasons which move 
him to impose the sentence which he does also serves the interests of justice. 
The absence of such reasons may operate unfairly, as against both the 
accused person and the State. [Otherwise] … there may be no indication … 
on what factual basis the Court approached the question of sentence. 
                                            
187  See S v PB 2013 2 SACR 533 (SCA) para 18, inter alia noting that "… no two cases 
present exactly the same factual matrix".  
188  S v Hartmann 1975 3 SA 532 (C) 536-537. 
189  S v Potgieter 1994 1 SACR 61 (A); S v Ingram 1995 1 SACR 1 (A). 
190  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (3) 162.  
191  See S v Maake 2011 1 SACR 263 (SCA) paras 19-24 (original in-text references 
have been deleted for purposes of the present discussion).  
192  See R v Majerero 1948 3 SA 1032 (A) 1033; R v Van der Walt 1952 4 SA 382 (A) 
383; R v Huebsch 1953 2 SA 561 (A) 565. 
193  S v Maake 2011 1 SACR 263 (SCA) para 22. 
194  S v Immelman 1978 3 SA 726 (A) 729B–D. 
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Maake closed this aspect by noting that legislation requires both "superior" 
and magistrates' courts to give reasons for their decisions about the law or 
the facts.195 
None of these considerations are satisfied when legislation prescribes 
sentences without giving reasons and without any explanation for the 
periods of imprisonment it prescribes. 
Although the Constitutional Court considered the separation of powers in 
Dodo and concluded that parliament has an interest in the nature and 
duration of sentences that are imposed, it did not consider the arguments 
advanced above. In particular, it did not consider the inequality that results 
from the status quo, where the legislation imposed terms of imprisonment 
without any explanation or justification, while courts imposing sentence 
have to explain every fine detail thereof; nor the fact that the interests of 
justice inevitably suffer in the absence of such an explanation. The interests 
of justice also suffer because of the high benchmarks in the minimum 
sentences legislation. As noted by Scurry Baehr,196 instead of using the 
language of aggravation to increase the sentence for serious instances of 
these crimes, the high starting points force the courts to employ the 
language of mitigation to get to a lower (proportional) sentence.  
Even when the minimum sentences are found to violate certain rights, the 
justification of such infringements will have to be considered as well. Given 
the relative harshness of the prescribed sentences, combined with the 
temporary nature of the legislation, it has generally been agreed that it is 
the main aim of the Act to combat crime; in other words, to serve as a 
deterrent.197 Recently it appears as if sentencing consistency is also 
considered an important objective,198 although this view is, at best, 
debatable.199 There is a massive body of research on the deterrent effect of 
                                            
195  S v Maake 2011 1 SACR 263 (SCA) paras 24, 25 (s 146 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 and s 93(3)(c), (d) and (e) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 
respectively). 
196  Scurry Baehr 2008 Yale J L & Feminism 239.  
197  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) paras 16, 45: "…the very essence [of] the minimum sentencing 
regime makes for tougher and longer sentences… As this court noted in Dodo, the 
very object of the regime is to 'ensure that consistently heavier sentences are 
impose'." (See S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 11). Also see S v Mabunda 
2013 2 SACR 161 (SCA) para 4; S v RO 2010 2 SACR 248 (SCA) paras 40-41; 
Scurry Baehr 2008 Yale J L & Feminism 224, quoting the Minister of Justice's 
prediction that the minimum sentences would reduce crime. 
198  See Kubista 2005 SACJ 79; O'Donovan and Redpath Impact of Minimum 
Sentencing 13. This view is often deduced from the statement in S v Malgas 2001 1 
SACR 469 (SCA) para 8 that, "In short, the Legislature aimed at ensuring a severe, 
standardised, and consistent response from the courts to the commission of such 
crimes unless there were, and could be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a 
different response". Also see S v Brown 2015 1 SACR 211 (SCA) para 118. 
199  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (3) 91; O'Donovan and Redpath Impact of Minimum 
Sentencing 51-57. 
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severe punishment200 which, if proof existed that heavier punishment 
improved deterrence, should have provided ample authority to such claims. 
That it has proven virtually impossible to find such proof is a strong 
indication that it does not exist.201 
7 Concluding remarks 
It is appropriate to return to the question posed in the introduction to this 
contribution. What do we learn about sentencing from the Constitutional 
Court's judgments of the past 20 years? 
Ironically, there is less to be learnt than one might have thought. This is 
probably due to the fact that, when it comes to constitutional development, 
20 years is actually a brief period. There is room for clarification of many 
sentencing aspects, but probably none more so than the question about the 
point at which the legislative authority should hand over the sentencing 
reigns to the judicial authority. How and when this will happen, only time can 
tell. 
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